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Abstract
In 1991, Gabidulin, Paramonov and Tretjakov presented a public key cryptosystem of the
McEliece type based on rank codes correcting array errors, the GPT system. Making use of rank
codes in cryptographic applications is advantageous since it is practically impossible to utilize
combinatoric decoding. This enabled using public keys of a smaller size.
Subsequently, in a series of works Gibson developed attacks that break the GPT system for
public keys of about 5 Kbits.
In this paper, we present a new PKC based on the idea of a column scrambler—a non-singular
matrix by which the public key is multiplied to the right. The column scrambler ‘mixes’ columns
of the public key. It makes system more resistant to structural attacks at a little extra cost of a
few additional columns. Possible attacks are carefully studied. The system is found to be secure
against known attacks for public keys greater than 10 Kbits.
? 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. GPT public key cryptosystem
1.1. Rank codes
Let FN be a ?nite ?eld with qN elements, and let F1 be the base ?eld of q elements;
q is a power of a prime. Let x=(x1; x2; : : : ; xn)∈FnN , i.e. x is an n-vector with coordi-
nates in FN . The rank weight, or simply rank, r(x|F1) of x is de?ned as the maximal
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number of xi that are linearly independent over the base ?eld F1. It is clear that for
any x∈FnN r(x|F1)6min(n; N ).
For a matrix A the column rank r(A|F) of A over the ?eld F is the maximal number
of columns that are linearly independent over F. The column rank of a matrix depends
on the ?eld. In particular, r(A|F1)¿ r(A|FN ).
The rank distance dr(x; y) between two vectors x and y, x; y∈FnN , is the rank of
the diGerence x− y: dr(x; y) = r(x− y|F1).
For any code C the rank distance d(C) = d is de?ned by d = min{dr(x; y)|x∈C;
y∈C; x = y}.
If a code C has the rank distance d then it can correct all errors e with r(e|F1)6 t=
(d− 1)=2. (z is the Hoor-function of z.)
Let n6N . Any linear (n; k; d) code C ⊂ FnN satis?es the Singleton-style bound
k6 n − d + 1 for the rank distance d. A code C that reaches this bound is called a
maximal rank distance (MRD) code. The theory of MRD codes is given in [2].
Suppose we have a k × n matrix G:
G =


g1 g2 · · · gn
g[1]1 g
[1]
2 · · · g[1]n
g[2]1 g
[2]
2 · · · g[2]n
...
...
. . .
...
g[k−1]1 g
[k−1]
2 · · · g[k−1]n


; (1)
where gj ∈FN , j= 1; : : : ; n; g[i] = gqi means the ith Frobenius power of g. Any matrix
of the form (1) is called a Frobenius matrix induced by the generating vector g =
(g1; g2; : : : ; gn). If g1; g2; : : : ; gn are linearly independent over F1, then G is the generator
matrix of an (n; k; n− k + 1) MRD linear code.
For the code given by G there exists a fast decoding algorithm up to the rank
error-correcting capacity t = (d− 1)=2.
1.2. Original GPT public-key cryptosystem
This cryptosystem was proposed in [5] and a variant of it in [3].
A Plaintext is any k-vector m = (m1; m2; : : : ; mk), mi ∈FN , i = 1; 2; : : : ; k.
The Public key is a k × n matrix
Gcr = S(G + X);
where G is given by (1), S is a k × k non-singular scramble matrix, and X is a
randomly chosen k × n distortion matrix such that r(X|F1) = t1¡t, where t1 is a
design parameter.
The Private key are the matrices S;G;X and (explicitly) the fast decoding algorithm
of the MRD code.
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Encryption: Let m be a plaintext to be encrypted. Then the ciphertext is given by
c =mGcr + e =mSG + (mSX + e); (2)
where e is an arti4cial vector of errors of rank t2 = t− t1 or less. Note that e must be
chosen randomly.
Decryption: The legitimate receiver applies the fast decoding algorithm to c to obtain
mS and then multiplies it by S−1 to get the plaintext m. For any m r(mSX + e|F1)6
r(mSX|F1)+r(e|F1)6 t1+(t−t1)=t, therefore the receiver always recovers m correctly.
In this system the volume of the public key is knN log2 q bits, and the information
rate is k=n.
1.3. Gibson’s attacks
Gibson [6–8] proposed two types of attacks on the GPT cryptosystem, which are
eMcient for practical values of parameters (n6 30). These attacks are based on the
structure of the public key and of the generator matrix of the MRD code. As an output
of both attacks the cryptanalyst gets matrices G˜; S˜; X˜ such that
Gcr = S˜(G˜ + X˜); (3)
where S˜ is non-singular, G˜ is of the form (1), and r(X˜|F1)6 r(X|F1).
The ?rst attack [3,6] is eMcient when the conventional rank r(X|FN ) of the distortion
matrix X is small. In fact, it requires O(n3qsN ) arithmetical operations in FN , where
s=min r(X˜|FN ), and the minimum is taken over all decompositions of form (3).
The second attack is more eMcient when s takes greater values. The complexity of
this attack is estimated as O(k3+(k+t1+2)fqf(k+2)) operations, here t1=min r(X˜|F1),
and the minimum is taken over all decompositions of form (3), s is de?ned above.
According to [7,8], in almost all cases in practice f=max(0; t1−2s), and it is known
how to choose X so that the expected value of f =max(0; t1 − s).
Gibson showed [8] that for medium and high security it is possible to choose public
keys of 56 Kbits and 131 Kbits, respectively, in order for the system to withstand both
attacks.
2. System with column scrambler
2.1. The column scrambler
Suppose we have a code, either in Hamming or in rank metric, given by its generator
matrix G. It is well-known what occurs if we multiply G to the left by any non-singular
square matrix S: We obtain the generator matrix SG of exactly the same code.
But what happens when we multiply G to the right by a matrix P?
Lemma 1. Suppose G is the generator matrix of an (n; k) linear code C, C ⊂ FnN .
Suppose also that P is a non-singular square matrix of order n with entries in F1.
Then the code CP given by the generator matrix GP has the same rank weights
distribution as the code C.
210 A.V. Ourivski, E.M. Gabidulin /Discrete Applied Mathematics 128 (2003) 207–221
Proof. The proof is trivial.
A non-singular square matrix over F1 can be regarded as an element of a column
transformation group with respect to codes in rank metric: Multiplying a generator
matrix of a rank code to the right by an element of the group, we obtain a new
code having the same rank weights distribution, though the distribution of Hamming
weights might change. (For codes in Hamming metric the column transformation group
is formed by all monomial matrices.)
If we know a fast decoding algorithm for C and we know P, then we know how
to decode the code CP: Simply multiply any message by P−1, and make use of the
decoding algorithm for C. However, if do not know P, it is not known in general
how to decode CP. Therefore we can regard P as a sort of scrambler, and call it the
column (right) scrambler. Similarly, we call the matrix S (see above) the row (left)
scrambler.
The main bulk of the work is to elaborate a column scrambler which can give the
system enhanced security.
2.2. The system
The Public key is a matrix
Gopen = S([O G] + [X1 X2])P:
Here
• S is a square non-singular matrix of order k with entries in FN chosen at random—
the row scrambler,
• O is the k × m matrix of 0’s,
• G is the k × n generator matrix of an MRD code of the form (1) with generating
vector g,
• X1 is some k × m matrix whose properties are discussed below—the ?rst distortion
matrix,
• X2 is a k × n matrix with r(X2|F1) = t1—the second distortion matrix,
• P is a non-singular matrix of order n+m with entries in F1—the column scrambler.
One can see that this system is very similar to the system described in [4]. But they
are diGerent. In [4], the matrix P is a column permutation matrix. And it was used
to hide n ‘correct’ columns among n+ m columns. The ‘correct’ columns give a fast
decoding algorithm, which corrects all arti?cial errors.
In general, a non-singular P not only permutes the columns of G, but also ‘mixes’
them with columns of the distortion matrix X1. This seemingly strengthens the security
of the system with respect to structural attacks.
Encryption: Let m be an information k-vector (plaintext). The ciphertext is
c =mGopen + e;
where e is an arti?cial vector of errors of rank t2 = t − t1 = (n− k)=2 − t1.
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Decryption: Upon receiving the ciphertext c, the legitimate user computes
c′ = (c′1; c
′
2; : : : ; c
′
n+m) = cP
−1 =mS([O G] + [X1 X2]) + eP−1:
From c′ he extracts the subvector
c′′ = (c′m+1; c
′
k+2; : : : ; c
′
n+k) =mSG +mSX2 + e
′′;
where e′′ is the subvector of eP−1, hence r(e′′|F1)6 t2. Taking into account that
r(mSX2|F1)6 t1, it follows that r(mSX2+e′′|F1)6 t1+t2=t. Applying a fast decoding
algorithm to c′′, the legitimate user gets mS, and easily m.
3. Attacks on the public key
Evidently, the security of this new system against direct attacks, which try to get
the plaintext from the ciphertext not knowing the private key, is at least as high as
that of the GPT system for a given n. And direct attacks are infeasible even for small
n ∼ 20. Therefore, the main security threats are structural attacks against the public
key, and we focus our attention on them in the remainder of the paper.
If the cryptanalyst somehow gets matrices S˜, G˜, X˜1; X˜2, P˜ such that
Gopen = S˜([O G˜] + [X˜1 X˜2])P˜;
where S˜ is non-singular, G˜ is a generator matrix of an MRD code of the form (1),
r(X˜2|F1)6 r(X2|F1), P˜ is some non-singular matrix, then he, of course, breaks the
system. One method to do so is to guess the matrix P. However, there exist about
q(n+m)
2
diGerent non-singular q-ary matrices of order n+m. Therefore, this is impractical
even for small n.
A simpler approach (in terms of the workfunction) is to get some n columns of
Gopen and try to apply one of the Gibson attacks. Denote these columns by Gn. The
cryptanalyst tries to factorize Gn.
The matrix Gn may always be represented as
Gn = S˜(G˜ + X˜)P˜;
where G˜ is a generator matrix of some MRD code, S˜—a row scrambler, X˜—some
distortion matrix, P˜—a non-singular matrix of order n—some column scrambler. If
r(X˜|F1)6 t1, then the matrices S˜, G˜, X˜ and P˜ will obviously allow the cryptanalyst
to decrypt intercepted ciphertexts, since G˜ gives the fast decoding algorithm, and X˜
gives the opportunity of correcting all arti?cial errors. This would break the system
completely.
As proven in Section 2.1 Gˆ = G˜P˜ and G˜ de?ne MRD codes having the same
parameters, and also r(Xˆ = X˜P˜|F1) = r(X˜|F1). So Gn may be rewritten as
Gn = Sˆ(Gˆ + Xˆ): (4)
From (4) it follows that we need to be able to construct matrices X1, X2 and P
such that for any Gn it would be the case that
r(Xˆ|F1) = t∗1 ¿t1: (5)
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Also, it is good to have t∗1 as great as possible. First, the greater t
∗
1 is, the harder
Gibson’s attacks to carry out. Second, for most of arti?cial errors the rank of the error
to correct is r(mSˆXˆ + eˆ|F1) = t∗1 + t2¿t, eˆ is the corresponding n-subvector of e,
consequently e would be an uncorrectable error. The greater the value of t∗1 , the higher
the probability of this event.
The main result on choosing the matrices we need to construct the public key is the
following theorem.
Theorem 2. With the notation of Sections 2.2 and 3, where G and Gˆ are Frobenius
matrices, and Gn is any n columns of Gopen, let
Gopen = S([O G] + [X1 X2])P;
Gn = Sˆ(Gˆ + Xˆ);
t∗1 = r(Xˆ|F1); r =
⌊
n+ m
t1 + m
⌋
v=
⌊m
r
⌋
:
Then it is possible to choose P, X1, and X2 such that
t∗1 ¿ t1 + m− v+ 1 (6)
for any choice of Gn, and any decomposition of Gn of the form given. If t∗1 ¿t1 then
Gibson’s attacks are ine:ective.
The meaning of the word ‘ineGective’ is explained in Section 3.2.
3.1. Constructing matrices
In this section we show how to construct matrices X1, X2 and P, and thus prove
Theorem 2.
One can readily show that Gn is
Gn = S([GP2]n + [XP]n) = S([GP2]n + [X1P1 + X2P2]n); (7)
where X= [X1 X2]; P1 is a m× (n+ m) matrix that consists of the upper m rows of
P, and P2 is the lower n rows of P:
P=
[
P1
P2
]
:
In (7), the subscript index n shows the number of columns of the corresponding ma-
trices in brackets.
The matrix [GP2]n is a Frobenius matrix with generating vector [gP2]n. If
r([gP2]n|F1) = n, then [GP2]n is the generator matrix of a certain (n; k; d) MRD code.
If it is not the case, add some Frobenius matrix G∗ so as [GP2]n +G
∗ would de?ne
an (n; k; d) MRD code.
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Comparing (4) and (7), we get
Sˆ= S; Gˆ = [GP2]n +G
∗;
Xˆ = [XP]n −G∗ = [X1P1 + X2P2]n −G∗:
The matrix X1 does not aGect decrypting ciphertexts by the legitimate user, but has
an inHuence on r(Xˆ|F1), so we should have r(X1|F1) as great as possible, namely
r(X1|F1) = m. The rank r(X2|F1) = t1 is already given. Other things being equal, the
rank of Xˆ is determined by r(X|F1), but not by the ranks r(X1|F1) and r(X1|F1)
separately, so it is better to have r(X|F1) = r(X1|F1) + r(X2|F1) = m+ t1.
Then we need r(X1|F1) = m, r(X2|F1) = t1, and r([X1 X2]|F1) = m + t1. Any pair
of X1 and X2 satisfying these conditions can be written as
X = [X1 X2] = Xbase
[
Im 0
0 Y
]
; (8)
where Xbase is a k × (m+ t1) matrix with entries in FN , and r(Xbase|F1) = m+ t1; Im
is the identity matrix of order m; Y∈Yt1 (n) (by Yr(n) we denote the set of all r × n
matrices over F1 of full rank r, r 6 n). The matrix Xbase gives a column basis of X
over F1.
Let us look at the matrix XP closely. We have
XP= Xbase
[
P1
YP2
]
= XbasePY; (9)
where PY = [
P1
YP2
] is a (m+ t1)× (n+m) q-ary matrix of full rank m+ t1. Hence, from
(9) we get
Xˆ = Xbase[PY]n −G∗: (10)
Our analysis proceeds further in two stages. First, we consider the general case and
establish the requirement on Xbase. Then we show how to build PY. In both cases, we
provide techniques to construct Xbase and PY complying with the requirements.
In the case G∗ = O from (10) we see that the rank r(Xˆ|F1) is equal to the rank
of [PY]n (the rank r(Xbase|F1) is given). What happens if G∗ = O? Since we do not
know G∗ beforehand, and G∗ might be any Frobenius matrix with n columns chosen
by the analyst after decomposing Gn to reduce r(Xˆ|F1), all that we need is to have
r(Xbase[PY]n −G∗|F1)¿ r(Xbase[PY]n|F1) (11)
for any Frobenius G∗.
Let T be a matrix transformation such that for any matrix W = [Wij], i = 1; : : : ; k,
it sets into correspondence a matrix WT = [WTij ], i = 1; : : : ; k − 1 by the rule
WTij =W
[1]
ij −Wi+1; j :
It is easily seen that T is a linear transformation over F1.
Consider a column w of a Frobenius matrix: w= (w; w[1]; w[2]; : : : ; w[k−1])T, w∈FN ,
a Frobenius column. Apply the transformation T to w to get a column wT of size
k−1. According to the de?nition of T, the column wT must equal zero. In the inverse
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direction, if wT has non-zero components, then it cannot be obtained by applying T
to some Frobenius column w. Applying T to a Frobenius matrix results in a zero
matrix.
Thus, the transformation T is a linear matrix transformation over F1 whose kernel
contains the set of Frobenius matrices.
Since T is a linear transformation over F1, we see that any columns in a matrix
W that are linearly dependent over F1 remain to be linearly dependent over F1 in
the matrix WT. This also implies that the columns linearly independent in WT were
linearly independent in W. It is clear that r(W|F1)¿ r(WT|F1) for any W.
Theorem 3. Suppose that for some matrix Z over FN the equality
r(Z|F1) = r(ZT|F1) (12)
holds. Then for any Frobenius matrix F of a suitable size
r(Z− F|F1)¿ r(Z|F1):
Proof. The matrix F is a Frobenius matrix and in the kernel of T, then FT = 0.
The following relations complete the proof:
r(Z− F|F1)¿ r((Z− F)T|F1) = r(ZT − FT|F1) = r(ZT|F1) = r(Z|F1):
What does condition (12) actually imply? It is clear from the properties of T that
at least one column basis of Z remains to be a column basis after the transformation
T. Since T zeroizes a Frobenius column, we see from (12) that the column basis of
Z does not contain a Frobenius column. Moreover, the linear span of columns of Z
does not contain Frobenius columns either.
Depending on the matrix F, the rank r(Z − F|F1) can be signi?cantly greater than
r(Z|F1): up to the number of columns of Z.
Denoting Xbase[PY]n = Z and G
∗ = F, applying Theorem 3 to inequality (11), we
obtain the requirement to meet:
r(Xbase|F1) = r((Xbase)T |F1) = m+ t1; (13)
since (Xbase [PY]n)T = (Xbase)T [PY]n, and [PY]n can be of full rank m+ t1.
The following lemma shows how to construct Xbase complying with (13).
Lemma 4. Suppose that w1 and w2 are two rows of length m+ t1 over FN having the
property that
r(w1|F1) = m+ t1; r(w2|F1) = m+ t1:
Suppose further that x1, x2 are any two successive rows of Xbase, and
x1 = w1; x2 = w
[1]
1 − w2: (14)
Then
r(Xbase|F1) = r([Xbase]T |F1) = m+ t1:
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Proof. The proof is given for 16m+ t16N .
First, observe that r(w|F1)=r(w[1]|F1) for any w. Second, let us remember that Xbase
has m+ t1 columns.
The following chain of equalities completes the proof.
m+ t1 = r(w1|F1) = r(x1|F1) = r(Xbase|F1);
m+ t1 = r(w2|F1) = r(x[1]1 − x2|F1) = r([Xbase]T |F1):
The lemma only de?nes the column rank r(Xbase|F1). The conventional rank
r(Xbase|FN ) can be made any within the range from 1 to min(k; m + t1) by choos-
ing the remaining rows of Xbase appropriately. For example, to have r(Xbase|FN ) = 1
set the rows of Xbase to be linearly dependent on x1 (for x2 put w2 = w
[1]
1 + aw1,
a∈FN \ {0}, and remember that w1 and w[1]1 are linearly independent over FN ); to
have r(Xbase|FN ) = 2 set w2 = w[1]1 + aw1, and all the other rows to be linearly depen-
dent on x1 and x2. And so on.
Lemma 4 also allows constructing Xbase with additional property that if we delete
some rows from it, then it will not change its column rank. In addition, Xbase with
deleted rows will satisfy (13). For example, if a single row is deleted, choose two
diGerent pairs of successive rows x1, x2, and x′1, x
′
2 according to (14).
Now that we have built the matrix Xbase, in (10) we may consider the matrix G∗ to be
a zero matrix, because it cannot reduce the column rank of Xˆ. Since only r( [PY]n |F1)
de?nes r(Xˆ|F1) now, we see that to maximize r(Xˆ|F1) the rank r([PY]n|F1) should be
as great as possible:
r([PY]n|F1) = t∗1 ¿t1: (15)
Lemma 5. Suppose that PY is given by the formula:
PY = [W1 W2 : : :Wr Waux]PW;
where r = (n + m)=(t1 + m); Wi is a non-singular q-ary matrix of order m + t1,
i=1; : : : ; r; Waux—some (m+ t1)× (n+m− r(m+ t1)) q-ary matrix; PW is a column
permutation matrix of order n+ m.
Then for any [PY]n
t1 + m¿ r([PY]n|F1) = t∗1 ¿ t1 + m−
⌊m
r
⌋
(16)
Proof. The upper bound is trivial.
To prove the lower bound recall that [PY]n is PY with some m columns deleted.
First consider the case when all m deleted columns are only from the matrices Wi,
i=1; : : : ; r, and are not from Waux. After deleting m columns, there is a matrix Wj for
a certain j∈ 1; : : : ; r from which at most m=r columns have been deleted. Then there
are at least m + t1 − m=r columns remain in Wj. Since these columns are linearly
independent, so the rank of [PY]n is at least m+ t1 − m=r.
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Suppose now that among m deleted columns ‘¿ 0 columns are from Waux. Then
from all the other matrices Wi, i = 1; : : : ; r, together only m − ‘¡m columns have
been deleted. Returning to the previous case, again we see that Lemma holds.
One can see that Lemma 5 is eGective when r¿ 2. This takes place whenever
2t2¿m − k, and thus always in practice, since we presume m to be as small as
possible, and t2 to be as great as possible.
In fact, for certain values of quantities n, t1, m the lower bound in (16) can be
improved by choosing a special kind of Waux. Indeed, let (n+m)− r(m+ t1)¿ r. This
means that Waux has at least r columns. Let wiaux, the ith column of Waux, be the sum
of all columns of Wi. Denote W∗i = [Wi w
i
aux]. Every W
∗
i has the property that any
m+ t1 columns of it are linearly independent. Reasoning similar to that in Lemma 5,
but considering W∗i instead of Wi, shows that
t1 + m¿ r([PY]n|F1)¿ t1 + m−
⌊m
r
⌋
+ 1; (17)
(here we assume that m¿ r, otherwise the bounds coincide and there is nothing to
improve).
Now extract P1 and P2 from PY. P1 consists of the ?rst m rows of PY. The last t1
rows of PY, say P∗Y, are
YP2 = P∗Y: (18)
Partition matrices Y and P2:
Y = [V1 V2]; P2 =
[
P21
P22
]
: (19)
In (19), choose V1 to be a non-singular matrix of order t1 (this ensures Y∈Yt1 (n),
see Eq. (8)), V2 to be a t1×(n− t1) arbitrary matrix, and P22 to be an (n− t1)×(n+m)
matrix of full rank n − t1 such that the matrix [ PYP22 ] is non-singular. Under these
assumptions the matrix P21 is straightforward obtained from (18) and (19):
P21 = V−11 [P
∗
Y − V2P22]:
Moreover, P =


P1
P21
P22

 will be non-singular. Indeed, the matrices [ PYP22 ] and V1 are
non-singular, and

Im O O
O V1 V2
O O In−t1

P=
[
PY
P22
]
;
then P has an inverse.
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Now we have PY such that (17) holds for any choice of n columns Gn. Combining
it with the result on choosing Xbase, we see that (6) is satis?ed. Thus, we proved
Theorem 2.
3.2. Security
The rationale behind the design of the system suggests that the column rank r(Xˆ|F1)=
t∗1 of the distortion matrix Xˆ, which the cryptanalyst obtains applying Gibson’s attacks
to any n columns of the public key, should be strictly greater than the column rank
r(X2|F1) = t1 of the distortion matrix X2 chosen by the cryptographer. But how much
is it greater?
Let us look at the error the cryptanalyst will have to correct. The ciphertext to
decrypt is
cˆ =mSˆ(Gˆ + Xˆ) + eˆ =mSˆGˆ + (mSˆXˆ + eˆ);
where eˆ is the n-subvector of the full error e used at encryption (see (2)). So the
error to correct is mSˆXˆ + eˆ. In general, for almost all messages m we will have
r(mSˆXˆ|F1)=r(Xˆ|F1)=t∗1 . For most of errors e with r(e|F1)=t2 we will have r(eˆ|F1)=
r(e|F1) = t2. Indeed, to construct such errors we can use a technique similar to that
used for constructing PY.
For any two vectors a and b it is true that
|r(a|F1)− r(b|F1)|6 r(a + b|F1)6 r(a|F1) + r(b|F1):
So it may turns out that r(mSˆXˆ+ eˆ|F1)= t∗1 − t2 = t∗1 − (t− t1). A heuristic approach is
to put this rank to be greater than the error correcting capacity t = (n− k)=2. Thus,
we require that t∗1 − (t − t1)¿t, or
t∗1 ¿ 2t − t1: (20)
If parameters of the system satisfy (20), then there seems to be the only visible way
to break the system: The cryptanalyst selects any n columns of the public key and
factorizes them using Gibson’s attacks. So he gets a private key of an instance of the
GPT system with distortion matrix of column rank t∗1 . In the best for the analyst case,
which in fact occurs very rarely, he should correct an error of rank t∗1 − t2 = t∗1 + t1− t
by the decoding algorithm that can only correct errors of rank t. Therefore the analyst
?rst has to make an exhaustive search for an error of rank (t∗1 + t1− t)− t=(t∗1 + t1)−2t
and of length n, and then decode the remaining error. The number of errors of rank r
in the space FnN is
Ar(N; n) =
(qN − 1)(qN − q) · · · (qN − qr−1)(qn − 1)(qn − q) · · · (qn − qr−1)
(qr − 1)(qr − q) · · · (qr − qr−1) :
For rn; N we have an estimation Ar(N; n)¿q(N+n−r)r . For each error the analyst
should try to perform a decoding to detect, if possible, whether this is a decodable
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error. This requires O(t3) arithmetical operations in FN . Thus, the workfunction for the
system is
W =O(t3q(N+n−t
∗
1 −t1+2t)(t∗1 +t1−2t)):
After making W operations in FN the cryptanalyst will probably be able to read a
message of Nk log2 q bits long.
If W is great enough, then the analyst won’t get a plaintext, even though he managed
to carry out Gibson’s attacks. This means that even if applicable Gibson’s attacks are
ineGective in breaking the system, and the analyst has to search for other attacking
techniques.
4. Other attacks
Why is it necessary for the cryptanalyst to select exactly n columns from the public
key? May it be more advantageous to pick up more or less than n columns? or less
than k rows?
Suppose the analyst selected more than n columns. If n= N , then there is no point
in additional columns: The code given by Gˆ will not be an MRD code, since the rank
distance remains the same, d=n− k+1, while n increases. On the other hand, t∗1 may
take a greater value than given by the lower bound (16) or (17).
Consider the case n¡N . Denote ‘ = N − n. It can be shown that the system will
keep its properties if the inequality
min
(
m+ t1; m+ t1 −
⌊
m− j
r
⌋
+ 1
)
¿
⌊
n+ j − k
2
⌋
+ t − t1 (21)
holds for every 06 j6 ‘. Actually, this is the generalization of (20), and it turns into
(20) for j = 0. Usually n and N are chosen to be as close to one another as possible,
because for a ?xed N this gives a greater t, and for a ?xed n this gives a smaller
public key. So it is not a problem to satisfy with (21) even if we need n¡N .
Suppose now that less than n columns were selected. Then formula (21) applies for
a negative j. As we noted after Lemma 5, it is always r¿ 2. For even values of (n−k)
inequality (21) holds for every −(n− k + 1)6 j6 0. For odd values of (n− k) it is
suMcient to check (21) for j=−1 (then it will hold for every −(n−k+1)6 j6−2).
So it is useless to select less than n columns from the public key.
What does the analyst achieve selecting less than k rows? His obvious aim is to ?nd
a code correcting errors of rank greater than t. Suppose some k− i rows were selected.
They de?ne a subcode of dimension k − i of the code given by Gˆ (see (4)). If this
subcode is an MRD code which can correct errors of rank tˆ ¿ t, then the analyst
can bene?t from it: If tˆ¿ t∗1 − t2, then he might be able to decrypt some portion of
messages (in fact, the portion is extremely small). What is more important is that the
decryption is only possible if the message does not contain a codeword of the whole
code which is not a codeword of the subcode. The fraction of such messages is 1=qiN .
Therefore, for i¿ 2 this attack is infeasible (see examples below). For even values of
(n− k) there is no sense to have i = 1, because it would lead to tˆ = t.
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Table 1
New system vs. McEliece’s
McEliece Example 1 Example 2
Field GF(2) GF(225) GF(232)
Key 524 Kbits 11 Kbits 25 Kbits
Rate 0:51 0:5 0:5
Workfunction 256 255 270
5. Examples
We give a couple of examples. The ?rst one describes the system with small public
key and suMcient resistance to all known attacks. In the second one the public key is
larger, but it seems to be more secure.
Example 1.
• Parameters: q= 2; N = 25; n= 25; k = 15; m= 5; t = 5; t1 = 3:
• Information rate: R= k=(m+ n) = 12 .• Volume of the public key: V = k(n+ m)N = 11 Kbits
• According to Theorem 2, the column rank of Xˆ is at least 8, and 8¿n− k − t1 = 7
as required in (20).
• Workfunction: W =O(t3qN+n−1) ∼ 255.
Example 2.
• Parameters: q= 2; N = 32; n= 32; k = 20; m= 8; t = 6; t1 = 3:
• Information rate: R= k=(m+ n) = 1=2.
• Volume of the public key: V = k(n+ m)N = 25 Kbits
• According to Theorem 2, the column rank of Xˆ is at least 10, and 10¿n−k− t1=9
as required in (20).
• Workfunction: W =O(t3qN+n−1) ∼ 270.
It is worth comparing the new system to the McEliece one to show the evolution. In
the McEliece example [10] a binary (1024; 524) Goppa code is used correcting errors
with Hamming weight not greater than 50. The volume of the public key is 524 Kbits
and the transmission rate is 0:51. The best known attacks against this system are by
Krouk [9] in about 256 arithmetic operations in GF(210) to recover only one 524-bit
plaintext vector, and eGectively implemented algorithm by Canteaut and Chabaud [1],
which recovers one plaintext vector in 264 binary operations on average.
The two examples above and the McEliece example are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1 shows that for a given information rate and level of security the new system
has the public key about 50 times less than the original McEliece system. And increas-
ing the volume of the key by a factor of two and a half makes the system signi?cantly
more secure while it remains of quite a practical value.
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6. Advantages and peculiarities
The important idea is to use a column scrambler. In fact, the McEliece system uses
some matrix P. However, P in the McEliece system is only a permutation matrix. Other
matrices cannot be used since they would change the Hamming weight of arti?cial
errors thus leading to unrecoverable errors even for a legitimate user.
For the GPT system as described in [5] a matrix P (either permutation or more
general column scrambler) would be useless from the cryptographic viewpoint. This is
due to the fact that GP and G are both Frobenius matrices giving explicitly the fast
decoding algorithms.
One of the reasonable ways to make use of the bene?ts that the column scrambler
can provide is to add some redundancy to the code in the GPT system.
One can argue that the system with column scrambler is very similar to that described
in [4] as they both use redundancy. But this is not quite true, because the underlying
principles and requirements to the construction of these systems are totally diGerent.
In [4], the matrix P was a column permutation matrix. And the security of the system
was based on the assumption that it is diMcult to ?nd ‘correct’ n columns, which give
a fast decoding algorithm, in n + k columns. In the system with column scrambler,
there are no ‘correct’ n columns at all. All columns should be ‘wrong’ and are ‘wrong’,
as they do not give the cryptanalyst a decoding algorithm, which corrects all arti?cial
errors. Besides, in [4] the matrix P was chosen independently of distortion matrices.
Now we choose them somewhat jointly.
In addition, the new system exploits redundancy very eGectively. The two critical
points of systems based on linear codes are the value of the information rate and the
volume of the public key. And they substantially depend on m. No doubt that adding
extra m columns makes the public key greater and lowers the information rate for
given N , n and k. Still, even in the case of m=1 we can obtain t∗1 ¿t1, and it is not
known what to do with Gopen in order to deduce a private key. This also implies that
we have an option to use codes of a smaller size.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced a new public-key cryptosystem based on rank linear
codes. To raise the security level we used a column scrambler. The column scrambler
is the generalization of a permutation matrix used in [4]. As shown above, the column
scrambler appears to be much more eMcient than a permutation matrix. The column
scrambler gives a lot of Hexibility in balancing the important characteristics of the
system: the volume of the public key, the information rate and the level of security.
Even for public keys of moderate volumes the new system is shown to be secure
against known structural attacks.
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